
Just weeks ahead of its mid-term evaluation, the 3,700-strong European Union Force’s (EUFOR) raison d’etre has come under fire in eastern Chad and north eastern Central African Republic. President Deby, while fretting over the rebel movements frolicking through Goz Beida, Oum Hadjer, Biltine and Am Zoer this past week, blasted EUFOR for sitting idly by while humanitarian warehouse were looted in Goz Beida (more than likely by poor Chadians than by rebels). For good measure, Deby threw in a little rhetoric about it being an “international conspiracy to plunge Chad back into civil war” without elaborating any further than that.
Even before the first French EUFOR soldier was killed along the Chad-Sudan border earlier this year or before Goz Beida was passed through by the rebel alliance last weekend, people were questioning exactly what this force was here to do and what they plan to leave behind at the end of their one-year mandate.
“EUFOR isn’t appropriate for the Chadian context. In the East, we need a good sheriff and a good judge more than we need an army. We need someone who can arrest [bandits and criminals] and someone who can judge them and put them in a good prison, so that we can stop the impunity,”
- Christophe Droeven, Representative, Catholic Relief Services Chad
This is the line you get from pretty much any humanitarian or development worker on the ground in Chad. In fact, it was the same line that EUFOR heard back in October from the humanitarian community as well. The threats in Eastern Chad - to the refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), the host population and humanitarians - are not, by and large, rebel groups or the national army who tend to clash in the dried riverbeds (wadis) outside of populated areas.
It’s banditry that’s the real, day-to-day problem. Stolen vehicles. Rape. Murder. All of it goes entirely unpunished and uncontrolled in the eastern region, which President Deby admitted in 2005 that he could no longer secure.
Journalists, outside observers, politicians and even the humanitarians themselves seem to forget that EUFOR was never the intervention force sought from the outset. In the earliest days, when discussions about stabilizing the eastern refugee camps and IDP sites began, all the talk was about a UNPOL/CIVPOL-type police intervention that would work toward security sector reform.
In short – rebuild the police, rebuild the judicial system.
The result of the discussions was the United Nations Mission in the Central Africa Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) but from the point of view of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) there was no way they were going to send police to Chad until there was some sort of military force to protect them.
In theory, MINURCAT is to put police in the camps and sites to protect the civilian populations and humanitarians and EUFOR is to secure the ‘humanitarian space’ around these areas. The two combined are meant to be a complementary force to the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which has experienced even greater delays thanks in large part to the Sudanese government.
Initially EUFOR was, at best, received with a deeply skeptical wait-and-see attitude by the humanitarian community and at worst, with a total cold shoulder. To this day, many NGOs refuse to even speak with EUFOR civil-military coordination personnel since they believe any contact with the force goes against their highly-principled policies regarding the distinction between humanitarian relief and humanitarian intervention.
Not too long ago, the EUFOR Commander in Chad, General Ganascia, pointed out that it’s time to rethink the role of EUFOR in Chad. Since MINURCAT has yet to train and deploy a single gendarme in the east, the force is being asked to perform the law and order role in the interim which, as Ganascia has pointed out “is like trying to kill a fly with a hammer” given the equipment and training of his military force. On top of that, they are becoming impatient with the various levels of cooperation with the NGO community and the snide criticisms from humanitarians (including many within the UN agencies who must, officially, be seen as supportive team players).
But really, if there’s a finger to point here, it’s not at EUFOR but rather at MINURCAT and the Chadian government for their miserable failures to-date. Finally, after more than six months of haggling with the government over silly questions like ‘what to name the Chadian gendarmes unit that will be trained by MINURCAT?,’ the first 70 police commanders graduated from training. The process for selecting and training the true, on the ground police, has only just begun and many within MINURCAT suggest that if the force is operational by the end of the year it will be astounding.
EUFOR’s mandate and 119m euro budget expires on March 15, 2009 meaning there may be an operational overlap of just three months – a quarter of what had been planned from the outset.
The reality is that EUFOR is being completely hung out to dry by nearly everyone except those paid to support its work. It stresses that its mandate is not a policing mandate. It points out the constraints on a geographical, logistical and operational plane imposed by the politicians in Brussels, N’Djamena as well as the harsh environment of eastern Chad.
It underlines. It highlights. It reminds. It urges.
But almost no one can seem to get it. The failure to stabilize the east isn’t actually a failure at all, because it’s not their mandate.
In a speech this week, the tough-talking Chadian Minister of the Interior and Public Security, Ahmat Mahamat Béchir, was forced to defend President Deby’s earlier criticisms of EUFOR. He pointed out that since the force arrived, rapes continue in the camps. Thefts continue. Security in the region has not markedly improved. On top of that, they’re allowing rebel groups to circulate freely. What’s the point, he asked rhetorically.
All of his points are, of course, bogus misunderstandings and self-interested comment underlying what Chad really wants – outside help in putting an end to rebel activity in the east. EUFOR beats it head against the wall trying to make clear they aren’t getting in the middle of the Chadian civil war (though their presence undoubtedly has an indirect effect).
For violence in the camps, EUFOR is not permitted to enter the camps to quell internal violence, since maintaining a civilian and humanitarian character in these areas is important to curb armed recruitment – particularly among children – and the circulation of arms. Rapes, for instance, continue in the camps because the Government of Chad, first and foremost, and MINURCAT secondly, are not functional.
But EUFOR takes the fall and will likely continue to take the fall for the failure of others right up until the day their mandate expires. Afterward, either the EU renews the mission, the DPKO brings in a traditional blue beret mission, or some other broader mission replaces it.
This transition, which is currently being discussed, is the most important question hanging in the air since to leave Chad now is hardly an option. In a sense, it’s been ten months and they’re still only just arriving.
Numbers Behind the Hybrid EU/UN Force
EUFOR
STRENGTH – 3,700 soldiers from 14 European countries (presently around 2,700 in Chad)
BUDGET – 119 million Euros
MANDATE – March 15, 2008 – March 15, 2009
MINURCAT
STRENGTH – 300 International Police, 800 Chadian Gendarmes/Trainees, 50 International liaison officers, ‘appropriate number of support staff’. (Presently, 340 staff in N’Djamena, 7 in Abeche)
BUDGET – USD 182 million
MANDATE – September 2007 – September 2008 (Undoubtedly will be renewed by Security Council)